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ABSTRACT

In countries that have recently transitioned to democracy, what factors most
drive citizens to mobilize and participate in early elections? Many comparative
studies on democratization and elections stress the vital importance of early
elections in new democracies – with voter turnout inexorably linked to a
democracy’s long-term stability and legitimacy – however, much of this litera
ture focuses on aggregate rather than individual-level behaviour, and very little
targets the Middle East/North Africa region. This study closely examines indivi
dual voting behaviour in democratizing Tunisia’s critical second election in
2014. We argue that amidst great uncertainty, the polarizing issues of national
and political identity created systematic disparities in participation – with the
most ideologically polarized citizens/social groups more likely to vote. Using
original data from a survey conducted in Tunisia right after its November 2014
elections, we find that Tunisians were sharply divided in their support for
democracy, the previous regime, and Islamic governance. Specifically,
Tunisians who were more ideologically polarized along its secular-Islamist
divide and those more satisfied with the new democratic system were more
likely to vote – overall suggesting somewhat uneven electoral participation in
this critical election and, therefore, the potential for the kind of instability
conducive to democratic breakdown.
KEYWORDS Uneven turnout; Middle East; Tunisia; regime preferences; satisfaction with democracy;

polarization

Introduction
Following the 2010–11 Arab Spring uprisings, Tunisia emerged as the Arab
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s only democracy. Yet barely a
decade after the revolution – on 25 July 2021—amidst widespread protests
across the country due to pervasive economic turmoil and corruption –
Tunisian President Kais Saied used a controversial emergency law to eliminate
Parliamentary immunity, suspend the Parliament, depose several high
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elected officials, including the Prime Minister. Most recently, his authoritarian
measures dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council on 13 February 2022. While
Saied’s moves have been enthusiastically embraced by the Tunisian military
and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt – it has most
certainly thrown the future of Tunisia’s democratic transition into chaos.1 In
light of these developments and their impact on the overall trajectory of
Tunisian democracy, it becomes imperative that scholars more closely exam
ine political participation throughout Tunisia’s early democratic experience –
and specifically which citizens were most likely to mobilize during its critical
second election in 2014, and why.2
While there is extensive literature on the determinants of voter turnout at
the aggregate level, the question of who participates at the individual level in
early elections in democratizing regimes has primarily been understudied –
especially in the MENA region.3 Following a transition, we contend that there
are three main paths a nation can take via its democratic transition: (1) it can
move back to authoritarianism if old elites appeal to voters as ‘the same wine
in a different bottle’ (e.g., Serbia under Vučić, Egypt under Sisi)4; (2) new
political entities can capture the grievances of citizens and attempt to create
another regime type (such as the establishment of Islamic regime); and finally,
(3) political actors can accept democracy as the only game in town (Linz &
Stepan,1996) (e.g., Spain, Portugal, or Greece). By closely examining who was
(or was not) mobilized and what factors motivated them in Tunisia’s critical
second election in 2014, we aim to understand better how citizen participa
tion throughout a new democracy’s outset can shape its future trajectory.
Prior studies highlight that, unlike established democracies, transitioning
democracies face far greater uncertainty regarding their national identity and
political future (Lupu & Beatty Riedl, 2012; Schraufnagel et al., 2014;
Stockemer & Khazaeli, 2014). By enabling a ‘multiplicity of social and political
actors’ to make ‘demands and claims’ on the embryonic political system,
participation in early elections provides a critically important mechanism for
societies to shape the national identity and internalize new norms, values,
and institutions (Cavatorta, 2015, p. 4; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Yet when
participation in early elections is uneven – that is, some social/ideological
groups are more likely to participate than others – it can create significant
volatility for a young democracy – from issues of non-inclusive policy-making
and unequal distribution of public goods (Franklin, 2002; Norris, 2002), to an
outright unstable political environment conducive to democratic breakdown
(Lijphart, 1997).
Polarization is a key factor strongly connected to the intensity and ‘even
ness’ of political participation. Polarization can create a more zero-sum poli
tical atmosphere that challenges the moral legitimacy of opposing factions
(Iyengar et al., 2012)—thereby intensifying supporters and compelling mobi
lization for groups that feel threatened by a potential loss of power and/or
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social status – particularly if this power/status might be gained by an ‘other’
(McCoy et al., 2018; Somer & McCoy, 2018, p. 4). Specifically, when participa
tion is skewed in favour of those with the strongest attitudes towards rivals
and opponents (especially negative attitudes)—in lieu of moderate citizens
more willing to compromise on issues such as national identity – it can open
the door for more exclusivity on behalf of elected officials (Abramowitz &
Webster, 2018, p. 134), and even compel some citizens to be more receptive
towards illiberal behaviour by politicians who align with their identity and
interests (Bermeo, 2016, p. 15; McCoy et al., 2018, p. 25).
Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of its
political transition and national identity, the stakes were extremely high in
Tunisia’s second election in 2014, following its first election for the
Constituent Assembly in 2011. As such, we expect that Tunisians who were
more ideologically polarized along its most salient cleavages – namely, the
secular/Islamist social divide and whether or not to embrace democratic rule
– were more likely to vote in 2014 as a means to shape the future national
identity and political trajectory, as well as minimize the influence and political
power of ideological rivals/parties. Specifically, we argue that a general lack
of experience with democracy and political parties in 2014 meant that while
some Tunisians were motivated to vote via an attachment to specific parties
(i.e., affective partisanship), many were instead motivated by negative
attitudes towards ideological opponents and political rivals (negative parti
sanship)—particularly opponents/rivals along its secular-Islamist cleavage –
who were best represented in the political realm by the Ennadha (Islamist)
and Nidaa Tounes (secular) parties. Additionally, we expect those most
satisfied with the new democracy were more likely to vote in 2014 due to
an intense desire to enshrine democracy – as opposed to some form of
Islamist or authoritarian rule – as the centrepiece of Tunisia’s future political
identity.
To test these arguments concerning voter mobilization during a critical
early election in a transitional democracy, this study uses an original survey
conducted in Tunisia right after its November 2014 elections. There are
several major findings: first, at the time of the survey, Tunisians did not
hold a firm belief over what type of political regime they preferred and
were sharply divided in their support for democracy, the previous regime,
and Islamic governance. Furthermore, Tunisians who stated more satisfaction
with the new democratic system were also more likely to vote when com
pared with those claiming nostalgia for the old authoritarian system, or those
wanting to implement Islamic governance. Most notably, those most polar
ized in their support for/hostility towards the secularist and Islamist5 move
ments were more likely to vote. All of this suggests that at the time of
Tunisia’s critical second election in 2014, Tunisians lacked consensus not
only on specific economic and political issues, but also on the direction and
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future of the national identity – thereby helping to stall momentum for the
ongoing democratic transition and consolidation process (Linz & Stepan,
1996, p. 3).
Overall, by offering new theoretical and empirical discussions on voter
mobilization amidst the uncertainty of a regime transition, this study con
tributes to a burgeoning literature that bridges studies of political participa
tion in the MENA region with broader comparative politics. Additionally, it
presents empirical evidence that regime preferences in general, and support
for/satisfaction with democracy specifically, have demonstrable impacts on
electoral participation. Furthermore, it utilizes an original measure of affective
polarization at the individual level and shows how it boosts voter turnout –
especially by those favouring secularist movements compared with Islamist
ones. Lastly, it shows that more moderate voters in highly polarized political
climates tend to distance themselves from the democratic process – a factor
which may ultimately render a polity more susceptible to authoritarian
appeals and democratic breakdown. In the next sections, we begin by dis
cussing the voter mobilization and polarization literatures – particularly as
they pertain to new democracies – and incorporate our main theoretical
arguments throughout. We then provide some background on the case of
Tunisia before describing our original survey data, regression analysis, and
results/conclusions.

Voter turnout in new democracies
Why is citizen participation in elections – and specifically who votes – so vital
early in the lifespan of new democracies? Defined as ‘moments of great
drama’ by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 62), early elections in new
democracies are crucially important due to the tremendous degree of
uncertainty following the breakdown of authoritarianism. Simply put,
these elections chart the course of the new democracy by shaping the
trajectory of the transition, the robustness of institutions, and perhaps
most importantly – the long-term national identity. As such, voting in
early elections affords a critical mechanism for citizens/social groups to
exert influence over the new regime and ‘determine the long-term axes of
political conflict’ (Pacek et al., 2009; Zielinski, 2002, p. 184). Furthermore,
several scholars find that turnout in early elections also helps to establish
the long-term legitimacy of a new democracy by offering a thermometer
reading of the young regime’s development/progress in the eyes of the
population (Kostadinova & Power, 2007; Linz & Stepan, 1992).
Despite the vital importance of early elections, numerous studies on new
democracies find that following a regime transition and first (transitional)
election – political participation and enthusiasm tend to diminish in subse
quent elections as citizen uncertainty fades, voter preferences crystallize, and
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more defined political parties emerge (Kostadinova, 2003; O’Donnell &
Schmitter, 1986; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989).6 Likewise, Pacek et al. (2009)
find a trend of low turnout in new, post-communist democracies unless
citizens think a particular election is important; they believe that they can
affect policies, or they feel that democracy is under threat.7 Overall, while
prior research provides aggregate level insights into the importance of broad
participation in early elections in transitional democracies – these studies
rarely speak to who is turning out at the individual level, and specifically, any
systematic disparities (unevenness) in participation between various citizens/
social groups. We argue that it is not so much low voter turnout, but uneven
turnout in early elections that can compromise the long-term vitality and
stability of a new democracy.
In the elections following a transition, prior studies suggest that uneven
participation may pose serious risks to democracy if certain citizens lose their
enthusiasm for the new democratic order and withdraw from political parti
cipation. First off, electoral democracies tend to pay closer attention to the
preferences of those who participate most vigorously, while ignoring the
voices of disadvantaged and/or less engaged groups (Lijphart, 1997; Verba
et al., 1995). This means that asymmetries in participation can open the door
for biased public policymaking and inequitable access to public goods
(Franklin, 2002; Norris, 2002)—both of which challenge the normative
assumptions of democratic theory that every citizen has an equal opportunity
to influence policy. Especially in new democracies, bias is critical – as policies
designed in the early phase of a transition can create a path dependency for
policy choices that can harm groups with weak voting records down the road
– thereby opening the door for the kinds of instability that is conducive to
democratic breakdown (Lijphart, 1997). In Tunisia, popular polarization
among those who did not participate in elections had not reached a critical
level according to our public opinion survey. While elite polarization on
secular vs. religious issues was critical in 2014, citizens attitudes diverged
from elites on other issues. Furthermore, both during and after the 2019
election, current president Saied was able to take advantage of widespread
public discontent regarding the polarization of elites over the secular-reli
gious cleavage, as well many other issues.8

Political polarization as a mobilizing force
A critical factor that we argue drives electoral participation at the individual
level – and therefore can create unevenness – is political polarization.
Polarization creates a more zero-sum political atmosphere that can intensify
various ideological groups and compel their mobilization if/when they feel
threatened by an ‘other’ (McCoy et al., 2018; Somer & McCoy, 2018, p. 4).
Evidence suggests that especially when facing great uncertainty – as in new
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democracies – polarization can mobilize political participation by generating
stronger attachments to parties and providing heuristics that simplify com
plicated electoral choices for voters (Hetherington, 2008; LeBas, 2018; Lupu,
2015; McCoy et al., 2018, p. 16). Likewise, polarization can have a differential
impact on citizen participation by both increasing positive attachment to
political parties (i.e., affective partisanship – see Lupu, 2015) and by intensify
ing negative feelings towards opponents/rivals (i.e., negative partisanship –
see Abramowitz & Webster, 2018)—each of which can drive uneven voter
turnout by disproportionately mobilizing citizens with the strongest ideolo
gical preferences.
In the face of immense political uncertainty, Tunisia’s second (2014) free
election presented a critical opportunity for motivated citizens/social groups
to exert influence over the identity and trajectory of the new regime. We
expect that Tunisians with the strongest ideological preferences were the
most likely to mobilize to shape the nature of the regime and emerging
national identity. Amidst such uncertainty, voting in the election represented
the best way for these polarized citizens/groups to ensure their representa
tion in the government. Overall, while the relationship between polarization
and mobilization has been examined in established democracies, our study
attempts to take this discussion to the far less explored MENA region while
looking at individual-level attitudes and participation. In the next section, we
outline the dimensions that we expect were most polarizing in Tunisia’s 2014
elections, and how positive and negative attachments to these dimensions
impacted individual-level mobilization.

National identity & regime type as polarizing dimensions in new
democracies
At the time of Tunisia’s 2014 elections, we argue that by far the most
uncertain and therefore polarizing ideological dimensions revolved around
the future direction of the national and political identities – namely,
whether to have a more secular or Islamist regime, and whether to
embrace democracy as the only game in town. First off, in the Middle
East generally and Tunisia specifically, the secular-religious cleavage –
that is, the extent and role that religion should play in politics – repre
sents not only one of the most salient and heated cultural divides but
one that frequently dominates the political struggles of numerous MENA
countries (Aydogan, 2021; Evans, 2011; Karakoç & Özcan, 2022; Ozen,
2018, 2020). Likewise, especially in recent years, religious identities have
frequently been politicized by elite actors seeking political gain – thereby
further heightening their salience in politics (Hashemi & Postel, 2017;
Karakoç & Başkan, 2012).
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Moreover, in new democracies, the main ideological fault lines frequently
coalesce around the future of the political system, and the choice between
democracy and other forms of government (Lupu & Beatty Riedl, 2012)—
rather than the classical left-right spectrum observed in established democ
racies, which is mainly defined by economic issues. In new democracies,
regime preferences have heightened salience in terms of mobilization
because groups that strongly supported the previous regime and those
significantly repressed by it can be highly motivated by their potential loss
of socioeconomic status or newfound opportunity for empowerment/
change, respectively. Additionally, if a transition period temporarily increases
social and economic turmoil, then supporters of democracy may experience
backlash and counter-mobilization by those feeling nostalgia for the old
authoritarian days.9 Overall, political polarization tends to be higher in new/
transitioning democracies (Jou, 2016; McAllister & White, 2007)—rendering
the hyper-salient dimensions of national/political identity the driving forces
of popular mobilization in early elections. We argue that in its critical second
election in 2014, Tunisians most polarized around its secular-Islamist divide,
and those most invested in democracy as its political future, were most
likely to vote.
Regarding how polarization may have impacted individual Tunisians, we
expect that both affective and negative partisanship each played a role – but
that negative attitudes were more of a mobilizing factor throughout the 2014
election. First off, it is essential to note that developing party identification
takes time, given that parties in new democracies are often viewed as less
institutionalized (Lupu & Beatty Riedl, 2012; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). In
only its second formative election, Tunisians still had limited experience with
electoral democracy and political parties – meaning that most hadn’t the time
to develop a strong psychological attachment to any of the major parties
within the political arena. As such, when asked whether they were attached
to any of the political parties in Tunisia, around 55 per cent of respondents in
our study said ‘No.’ Additionally, the major parties – Nidaa Tounes (secularist)
and Ennahda (Islamist)—were relatively indistinct regarding key economic
issues, as both generally accepted neo-liberal doctrine and even formed a
coalition government following the election.10
The true divide between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda came at the symbolic
level, and centred on the identity of the new democracy. Lacking divergence
in any major policy area, Nidaa Tounes heavily employed identity politics to
distinguish itself in the lead up to the 2014 elections – primarily targeting
Ennahda with negative attacks to intensify and mobilize its supporters. As
such, of the 45 per cent of respondents who did claim attachment to a party,
nearly 20 per cent more felt closer to Nidaa Tounes (42.7 per cent) than
Ennahda (24 per cent)—potentially highlighting the effectiveness of their
attacks and the heightened cohesion they created amongst supporters.
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Furthermore, Table 4 (further below) shows that a sizable percentage of
respondents (around 42 per cent for each party) held negative feelings
towards the opposite group – overall suggesting that the negative attitudes
towards political opponents/rivals developed early in Tunisia’s transition not
only played a role in mobilizing the most ideologically intense citizens
throughout its second election, but may have stifled its democratic transition
altogether by turning off more moderate/compromising voters from the
democratic process.
To conclude, by examining individual rather than aggregate-level voting
behaviour in Tunisia’s second election in 2014, we test the above arguments
concerning how the polarizing dimensions of national identity and political
trajectory impacted voter turnout. Overall, we contend that polarization
along these hyper-salient dimensions drove systematic disparities (uneven
ness) in the participation levels of more moderate versus ideologically inten
sified citizens – all of which may have compromised the long-term cohesion
and stability of the new democracy. In the next sections, we discuss the
background of Tunisia’s 2014 elections before describing our original survey
data, regression analysis, and results/conclusions.

Contextualizing Tunisia prior to the 2014 election
To begin, we must first recount the events between Tunisia’s founding
democratic elections (held in 2011) and the lead up to its second elections
in 2014. The founding elections took place in October 2011, less than a year
after ex-ruler Ben Ali was ousted from power (on 14 January 2011) following a
massive popular uprising sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed
Bouazizi on 17 December 2010. Enthusiasm for a new democratic era resulted
in moderate-to-high turnout in the October 2011 elections – depending on
whether one looks at just registered voters (92.2 per cent) or the entire voting
age population (53.9 per cent).11
In the elections, while Ennahda became the clear winner with 37 per cent
of votes; however, not a single political party managed enough support to
capture a legislative majority in the Constituent Assembly. The remaining
four parties (all secularist) ranged from 8.7 per cent (Congrés pour la
République-CPR), 7 per cent (Forum démocratique pour le travail et les
libertés-Ettakatol), 6.7 per cent (Aridha), and 4 per cent (PDP). Ennahda
leadership immediately sought a broad coalition government to help ease
political tensions, and as a result, an agreement was struck between
Ennahda, the left-leaning CPR (headed by expert human rights activist
Moncef Marzouki), and the centre-left Ettaktatol party. Ennahda would
take the lead role in the government, while leaders from CPR (Marzouki)
and Ettakatol would go to the Presidential palace and become the assembly
speaker, respectively.
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Despite the formation of this coalition government – which symbolized
the promise of a new democratic future for Tunisia via power-sharing and
compromise – political violence erupted in 2013 with the assassination of two
secular, leftist politicians. Immediately, these events intensified the pre-exist
ing tensions between the secular and Islamist camps in Tunisian politics.
While Ennahda’s leadership attempted to distance the party from the vio
lence associated with the extremist Salafi movements, the secularist parties
repeatedly scrutinized Ennahda’s intentions, and blamed it for ‘inconsistency’
in its claims of protecting democracy and its ‘latent’ endorsement of the
extremist Salafi movement, which was attracting popular support.
It was amid these tensions that a new political party, Nidaa Tounes, began
appealing to the secular-oriented public by singing the songs of the ancien
régime. Founded and led by veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi – an impor
tant figure of the old regime (especially under Bourguiba)—Nidaa Tounes
quickly exacerbated discontent by emphasizing Ennahda as responsible for
the weak economy and social unrest that were undermining Tunisia’s pro
gress towards becoming a democracy. Furthermore, Essebsi and his party
verbally championed republican ideals while accusing Ennahda of under
mining them. By the summer of 2013, all of this came to a head when massive
protests broke out demanding the resignation of the Ennahda government
due to ‘poor’ performance and a lack of substantial advancement in the
constitution-making process. Some consider these mass protests to have
been inspired by similar occurrences around the same time in Egypt – with
the Egyptian military forcefully removing the Muslim Brotherhood-led gov
ernment in a 2013 coup. Ultimately, encouraged by the fall of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, secularists in Tunisia continued to pressure Ennahda
until it was forced to resign – despite it finally drafting timetables for both a
new round of elections, and completing the process of drafting a new
constitution. From a strategic viewpoint, Ennahda’s withdrawal avoided the
possibility of an extended political crisis while keeping the party alive as a key
political actor.
Overall, the rise of influential figures from the old authoritarian regime
can be considered a reaction against Ennahda’s half-hearted attempts of
lustration.12 Ennahda leadership – along with other parties in the govern
ment – formed the lustration bargain by excluding from the electoral
process every single political elite who had a role in the Ben Ali regime
(Andrieu, 2016; Lamont, 2013; Marks, 2015). With the 2014 elections on the
horizon, Ennahda leadership pushed a lustration law that would signifi
cantly limit former regime actors from running in the general elections;
however, the rising domestic political violence, as well as military coup in
Egypt, ultimately limited Ennahda’s ‘margin of strategic manoeuvre’ (Marks,
2015, p. 10). Eventually, all these factors led to the resurgence of key figures
from the previous regime – especially within the ranks of Nidaa Tounes
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(Wolf, 2017, p. 154). With Ennahda’s poor early performance and disappoint
ment amongst supporters, Nidaa Tounes was able to take advantage by
convincing many Tunisians that their country was more stable and peaceful
under the authoritarian leadership of Bourguiba. Nidaa Tounes built their
electoral platform around the promise of returning to the times of Tunisia’s
‘golden age,’ as Essebsi frequently referenced the Bourguiba period in his
public speeches. By highlighting the political experience attained during
the Bourguiba period, Nidaa Tounes’ leadership argued Essebsi as the best
leader to govern the country.
Given the existing social and economic problems in the country – many of
which deepened following the transition – the nostalgia experienced by
many Tunisian citizens prior to the 2014 elections was hardly surprising.
Table 1—based on our original survey (see Research Design section for
details)—shows citizens’ responses to questions surrounding perceptions of
change across several economic indicators following the democratic transi
tion. Overall, we can see that many Tunisians adopted a very negative view of
the transition – with 70 per cent or more claiming that corruption, poverty,
and unemployment had ‘increased a lot,’ while the percentage stating the
same about inequality was only slightly lower, at 53 per cent. Furthermore,
the percentage of respondents stating that these problems had ‘decreased a
lot’ or ‘a little’ fails to reach even 10 per cent for any category.13
In general, when political instability and economic difficulties come to
dominate the social and political discourse in transitioning democracies,
citizens often differ in their support for the new democratic system (e.g.,
Grewal & Monroe, 2019). Furthermore, they frequently develop sympathy
towards alternatives. To capture the extent to which citizens supported the
new democratic regime, and/or developed nostalgia for the previous (nondemocratic) regime or Islamist governance, we designed questions in our
survey about these two alternative regime types – both of which were
extremely relevant topics in Tunisia’s social/political discourse around
2014. First, respondents were asked whether they had a ‘very favourable,
somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable’ opi
nion of the previous regime. Table 2 displays their answers and shows that
16.7 per cent of respondents had a ‘very favourable’ opinion of the previous
Table 1. Tunisians’ perception of economic problems since the transition.

Increased a lot
Increased a little
Remained the same
Decreased a little
Decreased a lot
DNK

Corruption

Poverty

Unemployment

Inequality

%
70
10
11
6
1
2

%
71
11
14
3
0
1

%
76
7
10
4
1
2

%
53
13
22
4
1
7
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Table 2. Tunisians’ attitudes toward alternative regimes.
Opinion toward Former Regime
Very Favourable
16.7
Somewhat favourable
24.0
Somewhat unfavourable
10.7
Very unfavourable
44.7
DNK
3.8

Governing this country with . . . . . . Sharia
Very Good
20.8
Fairly Good
21.0
Fairly Bad
14.1
Very Bad
37
DNK
7.1

regime, while 24 per cent of them said ‘somewhat favourable.’ On the other
hand, 44.7 per cent had a ‘very unfavourable’ opinion of the previous
regime, with around 11 per cent saying ‘somewhat unfavourable.’ Overall,
these numbers show that Tunisians were quite divided in their attitudes
towardss the previous regime, and nearly half (40.7 per cent) felt positively.
Next, our survey asked Tunisians whether they would like to see the
country governed by Sharia rule – with at least moderate support for Sharia
rule reaching 41.8 per cent. On the other hand, 51.1 per cent of respondents
claimed that Sharia would be bad for the country – overall, again showing
Tunisians as divided on this issue. Regardless of how people defined or
viewed Sharia and/or Sharia governance, polarization in Tunisia around the
role of religion in politics was very strong as of late 2014.
Finally, in terms of outright support for democracy, we asked Tunisians
what they thought about the country’s new democratic political system?
Displayed in Table 3, 89.2 per cent of respondents wanted Tunisia to be
ruled by democracy,14 whereas only 6.4 per cent dismissed democracy as
viable for Tunisia. Yet despite professing normative support for democracy,
not all people may have been happy with democracy’s performance in the
country, and/or were concerned with some of the uncertainties and

Table 3. Tunisians’ Attitudes Toward Democracy.
Governing this country with . . .
Democracy
Very Good
72.9
Fairly Good
16.3
Fairly Bad
3.7
Very Bad
2.7
DNK
4.4

Satisfaction with the Way . . .
Democracy Works
Very Satisfied
9.9
Fairly Satisfied
39.2
Not satisfied
18.4
Not at all satisfied
27
DNK
5.5

Table 4. Tunisians’ views towards islamist and secularist
movements opinion towards . . . .
Very Favourable
Somewhat Favourable
Somewhat Unfavourable
Very Unfavourable
DNK

Islamists
13.6
32.8
11.9
30.3
11.4

Secularists
7.1
27.9
10.2
30.9
23.9
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instability democracy can introduce. To investigate citizen support for demo
cratic operations and functionality, we asked respondents about their experi
ence with democracy via the question: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied,
fairly satisfied, not satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy
works in Tunisia?’ Here we see some divergence when compared with
responses about the ideal of democracy – with only around 10 per cent of
respondents stating that they were ‘very satisfied’ with democracy’s perfor
mance in Tunisia, while around 40 per cent were ‘satisfied.’ On the other
hand, 27 per cent of respondents were ‘not at all satisfied,’ while 18.4 per cent
stated that they were ‘not satisfied.’ Overall, we again see a sharp divide
amongst Tunisian society in their beliefs about the performance of democ
racy just prior to the 2014 election.
To conclude, citizens’ support or lack thereof for a new democratic system
is critical for its legitimacy. Those who are unhappy with a democratic regime
may give up hope and stay at home when election time comes or go out and
vote for a party that is associated with the former regime – thereby signalling
their displeasure with democracy’s performance. Overall, our survey shows
that as ‘the moments of great drama’ transpired throughout Tunisia’s transi
tion, citizens lacked a consensus on the kind of regime that the country
should embrace moving forward. Specifically, there was sizable support for
multiple non-democratic and alternative regime types – most notably, Sharia
rule and returning to some form of authoritarianism. To what extent these
opinions impacted voter mobilization remains an empirical question – as the
divided political climate described above, as well as ideological position/
actions of the extremist Salafi movement may have had a conditioning effect
on voter turnout in 2014.

Polarization in tunisia leading up to 2014
As previously discussed, one of the most important and relevant social
cleavages in Tunisia is the role of religion in social life and politics.
Therefore, the main political discussion after the transition developed along
the fault-lines of a more religious versus more secularist nation. Throughout
the revolution, both Islamist and secularist groups avoided mobilizing along
these lines to remain united against the oppressive Ben Ali regime; however,
this cleavage came into stark focus almost immediately after the fall of the
regime – when the country’s future national identity was most at stake. While
palpable tensions existed between the Islamist and secular camps right after
the 2011 founding elections, several subsequent domestic and regional
developments further polarized political elites in its aftermath. Beginning
with the assassination of two leftist politicians, then followed by the rise of
the Salafi movements, the military ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government in Egypt, and several domestic terror attacks by extreme
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religious groups all helped to seed a deep distrust of religious actors in
politics. As a result, the Ennahda-led government was forced to resign in
2013 in the face of growing unrest and protests by secular elites and the
larger population – ultimately leading to a new caretaker government until
the 2014 elections.
Furthermore, while elite polarization was salient across the secularist and
Islamist parties, this polarization was reflected to a much lesser extent within
society. For instance, mass polarization around the conventional left-right
ideological spectrum fails to hold in Tunisia. When we asked Tunisians where
they place themselves on the left-right spectrum, 40 per cent of survey
respondents stated they ‘did not know.’ Overall, the left-right concepts
were not fully institutionalized in Tunisian society as in the transitioning,
post-communist regimes of the 1990s. To account for this, we used two
survey questions that targeted individuals’ opinions specifically towards
Islamist and secularist movements in Tunisia. Survey respondents were
asked the following question that probed their attitudes towardss the oppo
site side of the ideological spectrum: ‘Do you have a very favourable, some
what favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of . . .
(Islamist movements or secularist movements)?’ As Table 4 shows, more than
46 per cent of respondents viewed Islamists as either ‘very favourable’ or
‘somewhat favourable,’ while around 42 per cent had unfavourable opinions.
On the other hand, Tunisians’ views of secularist movements are more
complicated to interpret. First, almost the same percentage of respondents
(41.1 per cent) claim negative feelings towardss both groups; however, fewer
people had favourable opinions of secularist movements (only 35 per cent).
One reason for this might be a possible association of secularists with the
previous authoritarian regime. Furthermore, uncertainty here is far higher
than with attitudes towards Islamists – with almost 24 per cent of respon
dents claiming, ‘do not know.’

Research design
To explore voter turnout in Tunisia’s second free and fair elections following
its revolution, we conducted an original public opinion survey through a
national polling company (ELKA) soon after Tunisia’s Parliamentary election
on 26 October 2014. The electoral survey data were collected in face-to-face
interviews between November 4th and 15th via a sample of adults over 18.
The sampling units were determined randomly, and the initial distribution
was decided based on the proportional distribution of the population by
governorate. The second decision regarding the distribution was made based
on the rate of urbanization in the governorate. A stratified random sample
using the quota method was adopted to collect data. Demographic quotas
were applied to the governorates based on the most recent national census
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data gathered from the National Institution of Statistics (INS). The sample was
derived from 24 Tunisian governorates – including Tunis (capital), Sfax,
Nabeul, Ariana (in northern Tunisia), Sidi Bouzid (where uprisings started in
2010), Gafsa, and Tataouine (in the south). Overall, the response rate was 73
per cent, which is relatively high, and 2,125 households were visited for a total
of around 1,550 respondents.

Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is dichotomous. Respondents were asked simply
whether or not they voted in the 2014 Tunisian general elections. In general,
there is the possibility that surveys over-reports the election turnout, a
possibility for which there may be several reasons (Holbrook & Krosnick,
2010)-two of the most common being memory errors and social desirability
bias. According to the official statistics, 67.7 per cent of registered and 47.7
per cent of eligible voters turned out in 2014 elections. In our survey data,
respondents who claimed that they voted in the 2014 elections represented
57.6 per cent of the sample – meaning that there is approximately 10 per cent
over-reporting in our survey.

Independent variables
Based on our expectations, we analysed the effects of the following explana
tory variables on voter turnout in the 2014 elections: (a) satisfaction with the
democratic system, (b) preferences over the previous regime and Sharia rule,
(c) attitudes towards ‘others’ or ‘outsider’ groups as a social/psychological
measure of polarization, and (d) affective party identification. To reiterate, we
asked the respondents the following question to capture their satisfaction
with the democratic system: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied (4), fairly
satisfied (3), not satisfied (2), or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy
works in Tunisia?’ To measure respondents’ attitudes towards the previous
regime, we asked them to state their opinion of the previous regime, ranging
from ‘very favourable’ (1) to ‘very unfavourable’ (4). Likewise, we use the
support for Sharia question presented in Table 3—re-coding so that higher
values represented greater satisfaction with democracy, the previous regime,
and Sharia – respectively.
Next, we created a variable for polarization based on our questions
measuring favourability towards Islamist and secularist movements (dis
played in Table 4). This polarization variable is ordinal and calculated
using the distance between a respondent’s favourability towards Islamist
and secularist movements. We simply subtracted respondents’ favourability
of Islamist movements from secularist movements, and then took the
absolute value – thereby enabling us to capture one’s distance between
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these two ideologically opposed groups. Those who have the same favour
ability score on both questions are coded as zero, which makes up 43 per
cent of the sample. Meanwhile, those who are very favourable towards one
movement but very unfavourably towards the other are coded as three—
which makes up around 11 per cent of the sample. The rest are coded as
ones and twos – depending on the distance between an individual’s favour
ability across the two movements, indicating a moderate position towardss
both sides.15 Additionally, we also used two alternative measures to capture
the impact of polarization on voter turnout.16

Control variables
We asked respondents whether ‘any party representatives visited you at your
home or workplace before/during the 2014 parliamentary election.’
Respondents could choose either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ or decide not to respond.
Respondents who chose not to respond were dropped from the sample,
making this a dichotomous variable. According to our survey, only 12 per
cent of respondents reported that a political party representative visited
them, and only 1 per cent failed to respond to this question. Therefore, 87
per cent of survey respondents stated that no party representative had visited
them around the 2014 elections. The party breakdown of representatives
who mobilized door-to-door is as follows: 42 per cent were from Ennahda, 27
per cent were from Nidaa Tounes, three smaller non-Islamist parties each had
6 per cent, while 11 per cent of representatives were from other political
parties.
We also include several other control variables in our models to account
for factors likely to influence individuals’ decisions to participate in the
general elections. The first set of controls consists of demographic factors
such as age, gender (female = 1), formal educational level, and whether
respondents were employed in the public sector. The education variable
ranges between one (never went to school) and eleven (graduate degree),
while income ranges from one to seven—with higher numbers indicating a
higher respondent income over the previous six months. Finally, public sector
employment is dichotomous and coded as one if the respondent worked for
a public institution (representing 12 per cent of the sample).
Next, we pay special attention to Tunisians’ perceptions of their household
and the national economy, given that it was one of the most salient issues
both before and after the revolution. The transition literature offers important
insights about how people react to new political institutions and economic
uncertainty throughout a regime transition.17 To test this argument, we asked
respondents two questions regarding the economic situation in their house
holds/country: ‘Considering the last 12 months, do you think that your house
hold economy (first question) and national economy (second question)
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became better (1), remained the same (2), or became worse (3)?’ Responses
were re-coded so that higher values represented a more positive outlook.
Overall, the correlation between this variable and the decision to vote is only
0.26, with 52 per cent of respondents stating that economic conditions at
home had worsened and around 84 per cent saying the same about the
national economy. Additionally, given the importance of social class and
political participation, we also constructed a wealth variable that accounts
for one’s ownership of items such as a car, second home, computer, washing
machine, etc. This variable ranges between zero (not owning any of these)
and seven (owning all).
We also include religiosity as a control given the saliency of religion’s role
in Tunisian politics. Here we ask multiple questions in our survey that account
for both behavioural and attitudinal aspects of religiosity; however, we only
include the attitudinal variable in our statistical models because the inclusion
of the behavioural questions (such as praying five times a day, reading the
Quran, and fasting during Ramadan) significantly decreased our sample size.
The attitudinal questions focused directly on the respondents’ perception of
religion in their daily lives – with the response categories ranging from zero
(not religious at all) to two (very religious). Furthermore, given the impor
tance of ‘interest in politics’ as a predictor of voter turnout, we asked the
respondents, ‘how interested would you say you are in politics?’ Responses
here ranged from ‘not interested at all’ (one) to ‘very much interested’ (four).
Finally, we control for urban and rural differences – and important factor in
Tunisian politics – which are coded as a one for ‘urban’ and as a zero for ‘rural’.
The appendix section includes descriptive statistics, the wordings of all
questions, and all supplementary statistical models.
Lastly, we argue that participation in the 2011 protests and membership in
labour unions/civil society organizations could affect respondents’ decisions
to participate in the 2014 elections. Respondents were asked whether they
‘participated in any protest movement from December 2010 to January 2011
that led to the fall of ex-president Ben Ali.’ Respondents’ answers are coded
dichotomously as a ‘one’ if they say ‘yes’, and ‘zero’ if they say ‘no’.
Additionally, we asked respondents whether they have ever been part of a
labour union or civil society organization – which generated two more binary
variables with a value of ‘one’ if the respondents answered ‘yes’.

Results and discussion
To test our arguments, we turn to multivariate regression analysis. We use
probit estimation due to the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable.
Table 5 shows the results of our analyses, with Model 1 including only the
independent variables, Model 2 adding in control variables, and finally, Model
3 interacting the effect of affective partisanship with our polarization
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Table 5. Multivariate analysis of electoral turnout in the 2014 elections.
VOTER TURNOUT
Polarization
Satisfaction w/Democracy
Disfavour Previous Regime
Support for Sharia
Nidaa Supporter
Ennahda Supporter

Model 1
0.108***
(0.038)
0.142***
(0.040)
0.086***
(0.035)
−0.014
(0.034)
0.260***
(0.105)
0.131
(0.127)

Model 2
0.060*
(0.041)
0.069*
(0.044)
0.002
(0.039)
−0.059
(0.038)
0.209**
(0.111)
0.126
(0.135)

Nidaa X Pol.
Ennahda X Pol.
Household Econ. Improved
National Econ. Improved
Political Mobilization
Age
Female
Education
Political Interest
Religiosity (self perception)
Public Sector Worker
SES
Live in City
Arab Spring Participation
Labour Union Member
Civil Society Org. Member
Constant
Observations
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo R2
Wald Chi2

−0.476***
(0.154)
1,058
−692.49
0.028
38.85***

−0.084
(0.070)
0.046
(0.091)
−0.078
(0.133)
0.030***
(0.004)
−0.111
(0.089)
0.061***
(0.019)
0.231***
(0.056)
0.020
(0.079)
0.291**
(0.140)
0.063**
(0.030)
−0.196**
(0.095)
0.210**
(0.101)
0.461*
(0.296)
0.181
(0.237)
−1.987***
(0.297)
1,014
−557.94
0.151
156.95***

Model 3
0.093**
(0.050)
0.072*
(0.044)
0.001
(0.039)
−0.058
(0.038)
0.257**
(0.148)
0.344**
(0.207)
−0.052
(0.103)
−0.169
(0.119)
−0.082
(0.070)
0.053
(0.091)
−0.085
(0.133)
0.030***
(0.004)
−0.110
(0.089)
0.062***
(0.019)
0.230***
(0.056)
0.016
(0.079)
0.294**
(0.141)
0.061**
(0.030)
−0.190**
(0.095)
0.211**
(0.101)
0.468*
(0.297)
0.160
(0.237)
−2.037***
(0.298)
1,014
−576.98
0.153
159.39***

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

measure. Overall, in Tunisia’s 2014 election, we find polarization and satisfac
tion with democracy (SWD) to have a significant and positive effect on voter
turnout across all models, while support for Sharia had no effect.
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Beginning with Model 1, the measure for polarization turned up positive
and significant – showing that Tunisians who strongly disfavoured either
Islamists or secularists were more likely to vote in the 2014 general elections.
However, only support for Nidaa Tounes led to a significant increase in voting,
whereas affective partisanship/support for Ennahda had no effect.
Next, Model 2 shows that several IVs lost some statistical significance
when introducing our control variables. For example, the significance of
both polarization and satisfaction with democracy only reaches the .1
level. Moreover, disfavouring the previous regime fails to come up sig
nificant at all. On the other hand, being a Nidaa Tounes supporter
remains significant at the .05 level – suggesting a robust effect of
affective partisanship for these voters.
Finally, turning to Model 3—we explore the interactive relationship between
affective partisanship and polarization (our measure is built on negative parti
sanship) in Tunisia’s 2014 elections. Model 3 shows our polarization variable –
which measures the relative distance between one’s positions on Islamist and
secularist movements – returns to a .05 significance level, indicating that
citizens with the most intense attitudes/beliefs towards secular and Islamist
movements were also the most motivated to vote as a means of asserting their
interests in the face of ‘others’. As displayed in Figure 1, we calculated the
marginal effects of polarization on the probability of voting. These graphical
results further support our expectations that polarization positively mobilizes
voter turnout. Specifically, the marginal effects figure shows that the likelihood
of voting increased by around 5 per cent for each level of increase in our
polarization measure. Additionally, we find that Tunisians with strong support
for either party (Nidaa Tounes or Ennahda) have a higher probability of voting –
suggesting that affective partisanship played some role in voter turnout.
Furthermore, Model 3 also shows the coefficients of the interaction
terms as not statistically significant (despite being negative), thereby
suggesting that polarization (negative partisanship) does not condition
the impact of affective partisanship on voting. Specifically, the findings
show that for respondents whose polarization score is equal to zero, there
is a positive relationship between partisanship and the likelihood of
voting. In other words, partisanship is already an important factor in
terms of mobilization, and polarization does not further intensify this
positive effect on turnout for Tunisians. Overall, polarization remains
significant across all models (though only at the ‘1’level in Model Two),
thus supporting our expectation that Tunisians with more intense nega
tive feelings towards either Islamists or secularists were more likely to
mobilize than those with moderate attitudes towardss these respective
groups. Additionally, affective partisanship played a significant role for
Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda supporters, though more so for Nidaa sup
porters. One way to interpret this result is that affective partisanship has a
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Figure 1. Predicted margins of polarization (95 per cent CIs).

powerful impact on the decision to vote. Partisanship means that these
citizens were already mobilized by strong support for their party (and
presumably by a dislike of any ideologically opposite parties).
Furthermore, given that the coefficients of the interactions between
polarization and Nidaa/Ennahda support were not statistically significant,
this implies that partisan voters may have been less influenced by polar
ization than non-party supporters due to an already heightened political
awareness and activity.
In contrast, polarization (or negative partisanship) seems more critical for
those who did not identify with Nidaa Tounes or Ennahda. In other words, while
we argued that polarization should be a mobilizing factor for all Tunisians, it
appears that non-party supporters felt the bulk of its mobilizing effects. We
would suggest that a partisan attachment (either to Nidaa Tounes or Ennahda)
can have a similar mobilizing impact to negative polarization – as solid support
for one party tends to imply a dislike for ideologically opposite parties. In sum,
polarization had its most significant effect on Tunisians who were not attached
to either Nidaa or Ennahda.18
Substantively speaking, the overall trends in this analysis – such as rela
tively low turnout rates among the supporters of Islamists compared to
secularists – may be due to a few factors. First, the political climate in
Tunisia around this time was largely anti-religious, and there were numerous
anti-Salafi parties. Additionally, several Salafi parties that participated in the
elections were declared terrorist organizations – such as Ansar al-Sharia
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(Cavatorta, 2015). Moreover, several Salafi groups distanced themselves from
participating in the ‘man-made’ political system due to their quietist and/or
Jihadi Salafi ideologies which perceive democracy as antithetical to Islam.
Similarly, of the minor Salafi parties that were allowed to run in the elections
(such as Jabhat al-Islah, Hizb al-Asala, and Hizb al-Rahmah), few were able to
gain seats in parliament. Finally, the relationship between the Salafi move
ments and Islamist Ennahda was not always friendly – as some Salafi groups
accused Ennahda of being linked with US security agencies (Karagiannis,
2019), while Ennahda’s prime minister Ali Laareidh declared Ansar al-Sharia
a terrorist organization (Cavatorta, 2015). These factors imply that some with
Salafi beliefs were not motivated to participate in the 2014 elections.
Furthermore, the heightened salience of religion/Islamist movements in
Tunisian politics following the revolution may have mobilized more secular
ists. While Ennahda enjoyed higher popularity in the first democratic elec
tions following the transition, Tunisia’s economic stagnation and growing
security issues caused by radical Islamist groups disenchanted many
Tunisians – ultimately enabling an electoral coalition of secularist groups
under Nidaa Tounes to capitalize on a very negative electoral campaign
that targeted Ennahda.
Furthermore – older, more educated, more politically active, and
higher socio-economic status individuals were more likely to vote in
2014. Specifically, we find that Tunisians who participated in the 2010–
2011 protests and/or were active members of labour unions were more
likely to participate in 2014. This finding is unsurprising since electoral
participation is one of the most common methods of political participa
tion, and those who are more actively engaged in politics through out
side channels should be more likely to vote. Additionally, those working
in the public sector were also more likely to participate in the elections.
Lastly, findings concerning our measure of urban versus rural suggest
that respondents from cities were less likely to turn out; however, the
magnitude of the effect here is relatively small.19

Conclusion
While the broader Comparative Politics literature finds a strong connec
tion in new democracies between citizen participation in early elections
and the overall trajectory of a democratic transition, these findings have
largely been overlooked by research on the MENA region. To better
understand current events in Tunisia, this study aims to bridge the
above literature by examining the dynamics of Tunisia’s early democratic
experience – and specifically, which citizens were most likely to vote
during its critical second election in 2014.

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

21

We argue that in new democracies, early elections provide a vital oppor
tunity for citizens to mobilize as a way to calm the uncertainty following a
transition and shape the course of the future national identity and political
trajectory. Yet when participation in these critical elections is uneven—that is,
there are systematic disparities between more moderate/compromising citi
zens versus those with the strongest ideological preferences – it can set the
stage for the kinds of volatility conducive to democratic breakdown. A key
force driving electoral participation at the individual level – and therefore
potential unevenness – is political polarization, creating a zero-sum political
atmosphere that can intensify positive and negative attitudes towards ideo
logical opponents/rivals. In new democracies – and especially in the Middle
East – the most uncertain and therefore polarizing ideological dimensions
usually revolve around the direction of the national and political identity –
and specifically, whether to have a more secular versus Islamist society, and
whether to enshrine democracy as the only game in town. Our survey results
suggested that Tunisians were sharply divided in their support for democracy
versus other regime types. Furthermore, this analysis revealed that in its
second elections in 2014, the Tunisians most invested in democracy as the
nation’s political identity (as opposed to those wanting to implement some
form of authoritarian or Islamic governance), those with a secularist or
Islamist identity, and those who had neither identity but were more polarized,
were more likely to vote to shape the nation’s future identity to their liking.
To conclude, while polarization can help boost voter turnout – a seemingly
positive effect for democracies – our results suggest that when citizens in a
new democracy face intense divisions over the country’s direction (as
Tunisians did in 2014), political actors are willing to exploit these divisions
(as Nidaa Tounes proved with their extremely negative attacks on Ennahda/
Islamists), then polarization can propel uneven participation that can ulti
mately stall a democratic transition by signalling consent for more biased,
exclusionary, and illiberal behaviour by opportunistic politicians. Overall, our
study supports other research highlighting the potentially destructive effects
of political parties’ short-sighted, alienating, and incendiary electoral strate
gies in new democracies20—with polarization helping to intensify and
inflame secular-religious hostilities amongst some citizens, while distancing
more moderate voters from the democratic process altogether. Therefore, it is
unsurprising that voter turnout amongst registered Tunisians dropped pre
cipitously from 68 per cent in 2014 to 41 per cent in 2019. Furthermore, the
empirical findings of this study help to shed light on some of the more recent
developments in Tunisia that have eroded its democracy. Specifically, our
results show that significant segments of Tunisians were uninfluenced by the
elite polarization centring on the secular/religious social cleavage. Instead,
Tunisians were far more concerned with the issues of corruption, security, and
economic stagnation on account of widespread unemployment and poverty.
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Current president Kais Saied was highly successful in exploiting this public
discontent, using it to gradually erode the hopes for democracy in Tunisia.
Overall, Saied’s most recent power grab shows that a lack of robust citizen
enthusiasm – coupled with weak government performance/incompetence in
overcoming economic struggles before and during the pandemic – can be
used all too easily as excuses to abandon the hard-fought path to democracy.

Notes
1. For more, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/27/tunisiagulf-information-campaign, Accessed on August 9, 2021.
2. The first free and fair elections, named Constituent Assembly Elections, were
conducted in 2011 to draft a new Constitution. The Constituent Assembly voted
to adopt the Constitution on January 26, 2014. The 2014 election was the first
after a new Constitution that set the boundaries of a democratic political system.
3. Postcommunist studies have extensively paid attention to turnout in early
elections (see Kostadinova and Power (2007). Some exceptions include a
detailed study of turnout in the Arab world by De Miguel et al., Rosenthal et
al. (2018) and a few studies on Turkey and Israel (e.g., Rosenthal et al. 2018).
Otherwise, the determinants of turnout at the individual level have not received
much attention from MENA region studies.
4. The Egyptian case is also relevant here as the authoritarian Sisi regime initially
‘legitimized’ itself to ‘restore’ democracy through a coup and not-free/unfair
elections.
5. We use Hegghammer (2013) and Volpi and Stein (2015) definition of Islamism.
(Statist) Islamist actors are those who justified their (political) activism by
primary reference to Islam. As seen in the responses (see Table 4), Ennahda is
seen as part of the Islamist movements.
6. Also see Fornos et al. (2004), Kostadinova and Power (2007) and Kostelka (2014).
7. It should be noted that in the cases of Central/Eastern Europe, weak participation
in the two decades following the transitions did not initially endanger democratic
politics due to factors such as moderate economic development and robust early
enthusiasm to be part of ‘Europe’ (Vachudova, 2005)—however, there is growing
evidence that low early turnout in the region (especially Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic) has facilitated significant backsliding more recently given the rise
of right-wing populist parties that have embraced anti-pluralistic, anti-rule of law,
and repressive policies towards political opposition (Pirro, 2015).
8. We thank an anonymous reviewer who raised this important point.
9. A massive literature on citizen attitudes towards democracy in post-Communist
countries shows that popularity for returning to some variant of authoritarian
ism increases when there is a strong sense of nostalgia and/or dissatisfaction
with the new democratic regime’s institutional and/or economic performance
(Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Haerpfer, 2008; Mishler & Rose, 1997).
10. Despite our limited expectations regarding affective partisanship in 2014
Tunisia, we actually find evidence that a positive attachment specifically to
Nidaa Tounes resulted in being more likely to vote.
11. For more information on official electoral turnout rates in Tunisia: https://www.
idea.int/data-tools/country-view/284/40.
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12. Lustration – the purifying/purging of old-regime officials – can come in differ
ent forms depending on the context of the democratic transition, and the
potential power of prominent actors from the former regime.
13. These survey results – when taken in conjunction with Albrecht, Bufano et
al. (2021) finding that disillusionment with democratic procedures can
breed support for expanding the military’s role in politics – help shed
light on recent events in Tunisia and specifically the military’s embrace of
Kais Saeid’s actions.
14. For robustness concerns, we used an oft-used question derived from the World
Values Survey which asks whether democracy may have its problems but is
better than any other form of government. 83 per cent of survey respondents
agree with this statement while only 10 per cent opposed it.
15. Here, one’s represent about 21 per cent of the sample, while two’s represent
about 25 per cent.
16. First, we created three nominal variables based on the distance between an
individual’s answers for each group; high polarization (those who are coded
above as 3), moderate polarization (those who are coded as 1 or 2), and low
polarization (those with the same favourability for the two movements, coded
as 0). Our second robustness measure examines whether an individual’s favour
ability towards one group mobilizes them to vote. We use the original survey
questions to create two distinct, dichotomous variables-one for “favouring
Islamists” and the other “favouring secularists.”.
17. See Kostadinova, Kostadinova (2003), Kostadinova and Power (2007), Pacek et
al. (2009), and Turner (1993).
18. We ran an alternative model for robustness check, and the results did not
change significantly. We separated non-partisans and other party supporters
and included them as additional variables to draw the graphs in Figure 2,
available in the Online Appendix.
19. For the city variable, we merged town and villages as the former had a much
smaller percentage (8 per cent versus 30 per cent). Without merging, the city
variable is insignificant. Nevertheless, the size of the coefficient is very small for
both operationalizations.
20. See Albrecht, Bishara et al. (2022).
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